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FEDERALJURISDICTION

Can a Federal Court Review a State Court's
Review of a Federal Court?
by Robert H. Abrams

Parsons Steel, Inc.

v.
First Alabama Bank of Montgomery
(Docket No. 84·1616)

general rule that federal courts must not enjoin or stay
state court litigation unless the injunction is "necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." This case forces a reconciliation of the exceptions clause of section 2283 with its own general rule
and that or section 1738.

Argued December 3. 1985
FACTS

577-3973.

Edward and Melba Parsons owned substantially all of
the stock in Parsons Steel, Inc. (Steel). That corporation
was the parent of a subsidiary corporation, Parsons Steel
Industries, Inc. (Industries). The First Alabama Bank of
Montgomery (Bank) was the major financial backer of
Industries. In the fall of 1978, Industries owed the Bank
$1,000,000 in secured loans which Edward knew could
not be repaid when due. After negotiations with the
Bank, Michael Orange, one of the Bank's other customers, became actively involved in managing Industries.
Within a month Orange, finding the situation at Industries worse than imagined, bowed out. At that point the
Bank felt its loan, which was in default, was in danger of
being totally lost and foreclosed. Industries' assets were
sold at a foreclosure sale. The buyer was a corporation
(OSI) owned by Orange.
Against this unhappy and unprofitable background.
litigation ensued and ensued and ensued. The first lawsuit was filed in February, 1979, in state court by Parsons, Steel and Industries against the Bank, one of its
officers, Orange and his company OSI. The crux of this
suit was that the Bank fraudulently forced the Parsons
to allow Orange to gain ownership of Industries. This
suit was sti11 pending three months later when a second
suit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama. In this second suit, the
Parsons and the parent company (Steel) were the plaintiffs and the Bank alone was defendant. Industries-by
this time adjudicated bankrupt in a separate federal
proceeding-was not a party, nor was the trustee appointed by the bankruptcy court to marshall the bankrupt's assets. The federal lawsuit alleged a violation of
federal banking laws insofar as the acts of the Bank that
allowed Orange to gain control of Industries was a type
of unusual banking practice prohibited by the federal
statute.
For a time, the two lawsuits proceeded on parallel
courses through the discovery phases. After some proce·
dural maneuvering the federal suit, although filed later,
went to judgment first in .June of 1981. This federal
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The facts of this case, involving several parties having similar names and a welter of litigation involving
closely-related claims with a bankruptcy thrown in for
good measure are certain to be confusing. Still, they
form the basis for potentially important questions about
the finality ofjudgments and the relative roles of federal
and state courts. The merits of the case raise a basic
question about the doctrine of res judicata, "the thing
decided." The specific res judicata issue involves an illunderstood subdoctrine called merger and bar.
ISSUES

In particular, this case considers the effect of ajudgment on one claim as a basis for precluding later litigation involving slightly different claims and slightly
different parties but still arising from the same series of
transactions as the case earlier decided.
The federal-state relations issue is likewise technical,
but also important. Here, a state court initially found
that an earlier federal judgment did not bar litigation of
related claims in the state court action. In fact, a multimillion dollar verdict was entered in the state court
litigation. Thereafter, the original federal court ruled
that to "protect and effectuate" its earlier judgment, the
winners in the state court were enjoined from further
prosecution of their state court litigation. This meant
that they were barred from collecting on their state
court judgment, and the state court trial and verdict
were effectively set at naught. This action by the federal
court occurs at the intersection of two federal statutes
that control the workings of the federal judiciary. One is
the statutory analogue to the Constitution's Full Faith
and Credit Clause. This first statute, 28 U.S.C. 1738,
commands that state court proceedings are entitled to
full faith and credit in all courts within the United
States. The other statute, 28 U.S.C. 2283, announces a
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court judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendants
thereafter raised the defense of res judicata in state court.
but this defense was not accepted by the state court.
Later. the trustee in bankruptcy who had succeeded
Industries as a plaintiff in the state court action
amended the complaint to add a count based on violation by the Bank of the Uniform Commercial Code in
the foreclosure sale of Industries' assets to OSI. Slowly
the state court litigation was resolved. First, in January
of 1983. Orange and OSI reached a settlement with the
plaintiffs and were dismissed from the litigation. The
remainder of the case was tried to ajury which returned
a verdict for: Edward, $1 million; Melba, $1 million; the
trustee for Industries, $2 million; and Steel, $1.
As if two lawsuits were not enough, the Bank and its
officer filed a third action, this time returning to the
federal court in which they had prevailed earlier. Rather
than seeking to litigate the merits a third time, this
lawsuit requested that the federal court enjoin the enforcernent of the state court verdict because the state
court litigation of the merits was barred by the original
federal judgment in favor of the Bank and the proper
operation of the doctrine of res judicata. Eventually, this
final litigation resulted in a reinstatement of the Bank's
original victory. and now. the Eleventh Circuit's affirmance of the decision in favor of the Bank is under
review in the United States Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Fortunately. the significance of this case can be
roughly gauged without knowing a good deal about the
workings of res judicata. On a superficial level. this case is
significant because a substantial amount of money hangs
in the balance. Still the more important aspects of the
case are some of the possible ramifications it could have
for the finality ofjudgments and relations between state
and federal courts.
For the Supreme Court to affirm in this case it would
have to opt for a position that says, in effect, a lower
federal court can overrule a state court in regard to the
proper effect to be given to a federal court judgment.
This would be extraordinary in comparison to the position usually taken that the proper method for correcting
state court errors of federal law is appeal within the state
court system, followed, if necessary, by United States
Supreme Court appellate reveiew. At present. the only
role lower federal courts have in reviewing state court
decisions is in regard to habeas corpus relief for state
prisoners. Still, there is an allure to saying that the lower
federal courts should not be forced to sit idly by and
watch state courts erroneously construe the effect of
previously-entered federal judgments.
For the Supreme Court to reverse in this case is
consistent with prevailing norms regarding the lack of
authority for the lower federal court to correct errors of
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federal law made by state courts. Additionally, the federal statutory framework also tends to support reversal.
Section 1738 commands respect for state court judgments. By its terms, that statute does not differentiate
between correct and incorrect judgments. Likewise, reversal is consistent with the general rule of section 2283
that forbids federal injunction of state proceedings except in narrowly defined circumstances.
There, of course. lies the rub. In this case, the federal
court is of the opinion that its injunction of enforcement
of the state court verdicts is necessary to protect its own
prior judgment from de facto invalidation by the state
court. Congress has provided an exception to the general rule to allow federal courts to protect and effectuate
their judgments. If the Supreme Court agrees with the
Bank that this is one of the exceptions that Congress
intended, the case will be affirmed.

ARGUMENTS

For Edward and MelbaParsons (Counsel of Record, Frank M.
Wilson. 418 S. Hull Street, Montgomery, AL 36104; telephone
(205) 269·2343)
1. The state court judgment was entitled to full faith
and credit under 28 U.S.C. 1738.
2. The injunction issued in this case is barred by another
federal statute. 28 U.S.C. 2283. which is not an implied exception to the full faith and credit statute.
3. The action of the federal court in this case is not what
Congress intended when it allowed enjoining state
proceedings to protect or effectuate judgments.
4. The federal court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a
suit seeking to review a state courtjudgment.
5. It would violate due process to bar the trustee from
recovery on the basis of the original federal suit because neither the bankrupt nor the trustee was a
party to the original action.
6. A proper respect for the functioning of state courts in
our federal system prohibits an injunction against
enforcement of the state court judgment in this case.
7. Equitable principle forbid an injunction enforcing
the state courtjudgment in this case.

For First Alabama Bank of Montgomery (Counsel of Record. M. RolandNacnman.]r.• P. O. Box 668. Montgomery,
ALJ6JOl; telephone (205) 832·8800)
1. The courts below properly found this case to be an
instance in which an injunction of enforcement of a
state court judgment was necessary to protect or effectuate a prior federaljudgment.
2. The state court litigation was barred by the original
federal judgment, and relitigation of matters previously decided in the federal action was improper.
3. The trustee is not denied due process in being barred
by the prior federal action because he was in privity
with the others who were parties to that action.
PREVIEW
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